Saturday, December 10, 2022

Intergroup conflicts in Africa: Assessing the probability that the Ivory Coast conflict will spread to its immediate neighbors

 


Research Proposal

Intergroup conflicts in Africa: Assessing the probability that the Ivory Coast conflict will spread to its immediate neighbors

 Introduction

Mutiny broke out in 19 September 2002 in the Ivory Coast. What began as gripes over the demobilization of soldiers had turned into a bloody confrontation that split the nation into a predominantly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south. The rebellion threatens the economic stability of the region, particularly of French-speaking African countries belonging to the CAF-franc zone. The war is putting major powers to the test, that is, France and the United States. (www.globalsecurity.org)

Inscribed in the current global climate of ethnic and religious war, globalization and democratization, this conflict, like others of its kind, threatens to create political and economic impacts beyond its borders.

However, even though the Ivory Coast conflict appears to have the ethnic qualities of wars that have erupted in the region in recent years, there is reason to believe that it is not as complex as it might appear. Prior to the crisis, Ivory Coast has been one of the richest nations in Africa (it is the world’s biggest exporter of cocoa), with a stable government, high foreign investments, and a standard of living that has become the envy of neighboring countries. Although Ivorian Muslims have used the disqualification of the Muslim presidential candidate Alassanne Ouattara as one reason to support the rebels, Muslims and Christians have been living in relative peace for more than a decade. It seems too ironic that all these assets should be effaced by a rebellion that after all began over an issue of “job restructuring”, not a presidential election. It is quite possible that the importance of the conflict to the region has been overstressed.

However, the researcher’s initial model of the conflict should be ethnic as the division of the country into religious zones remains its most salient aspect. As a first approximation the model is adequate. However, the researcher notes that such a division does not rule out an opportunistic motive that has nothing ethnical to it. This paper will, therefore, apply the ethnic model but will seek evidence both for and against it.

 

Definition of the Research Problem and Main Hypothesis

This study, therefore, asks the question: how likely is it that the Ivory Coast conflict will spread beyond its borders? The premise of this study is that it might spread if its roots were more importantly ethnic, religious in particular, and that it will not if the roots were more political and more readily subject to negotiation.

The researcher hypothesize that it is not likely to spread, because the problem appears to be quite local and the issues negotiable. Besides, even if the conflict were religious, the influence of non-Ivorian players might be such as to outweigh the ethnic pressure to spread if the ethnic pressure were not strong enough, which appears to be the case. It further seems that Ivory Coast’s neighbors, except for Liberia, do not constitute ignition points that might take fire from the Ivorian rebellion.

 

Research Objectives

  1. To show that the conflict, though ethnic in appearance, is not primarily ethnic in motivation. Escalation of the conflict from a small-scale mutiny to a full-blown rebellion is fundamentally local and will remain local. The support of neighboring states for the rebels is not ethnically motivated either. Similarly, to show that the actual North/South partition of the country is only secondarily a result of religious divisions.
  2. To show that the interests of other players, in particular France and French-speaking nations in the CFA-franc region, will not allow the conflict to spread because the ethnic component of the problem is not strong enough. Also, to show that neighboring states, with the possible exception of Liberia, can not for now be qualified as ignition points that might take fire from events in Ivory Coast.

 

Sources of data and information

Data in support of these objectives will be obtained from media sources. These include international news services like the BBC, the Washington Post, and the Economist. Analysis papers will be sourced over the Internet, e.g., from the site of think tanks like Global Security (www.globalsecurity.org). Opinions for a Delphi forecast will be obtained from political science experts.

 

Suggested methods for gathering information related to each of the objectives

Three kinds of information will be obtained: environmental risk factors, political decision variables, and evolutionary development of each. These three kinds constitute a research checklist and data quality control tool as described below.

 

Internal and external environmental risk factors

Carment and James (n.d.) list a number of conditions associated with the violent escalation of ethnic conflict.

  1. A state is experiencing power transitions and rapid transformations that weaken its regime;
  2. A single ethnic group comes to dominate policy-making procedures and institutions and inter-elite accommodation is weak or nonexistent;
  3. The state provides a differential advantage to a minority group over distribution of resources;
  4. Political channels for the articulation of minority interests are weak or underdeveloped;
  5. The military is dominated by a single ethnic group;
  6. Elites maintain institutions specialized in coercion;
  7. Affective motivation and ethnic cleavage are present;
  8. Success of insurgencies and minority struggles in neighbouring states;
  9. There is third-party support for an insurgency from allies of the ethnic group.

 

Data gathered should either confirm or reject such cases as applying to Ivory Coast. Assessing these items requires an analytical model that might include quantified magnitudes and weights to describe importance. However, instead of trying to come up with such a model, this paper will merely use this list as a means of generating issues or controversies. The issues will be stated as decisions requiring resolution. Resolution will be the outcome of a political interaction between players in the conflict. This interaction will be assessed and evaluated as described in the following section.

 

Political decision variables

The analysis of political variables will be done as described by W.D. Coplin (Coplin 1976). The method, called “political accounting” involves gathering the following data:

1. Issues, stated in terms of a decision. In this case the major issue is whether to let the conflict spread. This issue can be broken down to others that will be analyzed separately.

2. Players (e.g., the 3 rebel groups, Pres. Gbagbo, France)

3. For each player, with respect to the issues, a preference function that depends on the following variables:

3.1.       Power, or ability to affect the outcome of the decision;

3.2.       Position, whether the player is for or against the decision, and the strength of his position (how strongly for or against);

3.3.       Priority, the importance of the issue with respect to other issues the player must deal with.

4. A measure of the combined preferences of all players, leading to a probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of the decision turning one way or another.

 

Evolution of environmental risk factors and political variables

Most information that will be obtained will give only a “snapshot” of the Ivorian conflict at a given point in time. But these variables are not static and their evolution must be assessed for the study to become more relevant. Are risk processes or attributes getting better or worse? Are players becoming more or less stubborn or willing to make concessions? Is there a player, now in the background, whose importance in the future is expected to increase and will therefore merit inclusion in a political analysis?

The probable evolution of variables is a complex process. In this paper, we choose to use Delphi techniques to assess that evolution.

The Delphi technique consists in throwing a question individually to experts who do not consult with each other. One question might be: “Do you think that the mutinous soldiers will be willing to accept a distribution of Cabinet posts as recently proposed? How long before they will accept any eventual proposal on this question?” The individual responses of the experts will be compiled and summarized, showing what each one thought. Then, the summarized document containing all responses will be sent again to the individual experts with the request that they re-evaluate their initial assessment. This process will be repeated for as long as there is time or when a consensus is reached.

 

Likely expected outcomes and implications from possible research findings

Two outcomes are expected from this study: a predictive and a normative outcome.

The predictive outcome is a statement about the likelihood of the conflict spilling over to neighboring countries. Depending on the quality of the variables measured, it may even be possible to state this probability in terms of a time frame (e.g., “Conflict will not spread across the border until the end of the year.”). The importance of a predictive outcome is that it gives a risk assessment that might be useful to businessmen or politicians who are considering investing in the region.

The normative outcome will suggest what might be done to influence the decision either way. Such an outcome can be valuable to diplomats interested in brokering a peace between the conflicting parties. The analysis of the variables presented here will either confirm the wisdom of measures being negotiated as well as others measures representing new strategies for dealing with this conflict.

Insofar as the Ivory Coast conflict shares similarities with similar phenomena in the region, the predictive and normative outcomes might be applicable to other countries. The method, at least, might represent an improvement over existing analytical methods. However, insofar as the Ivory Coast is unique—and it is our aim to show that it is not a typical ethnic conflict in the usual African sense of the word—this analysis might show, for example, that this and other conflicts have been wrongly or too narrowly analyzed. In this paper, we hope to put that possibility to the test.

 

Bibliography

1. Anonymous (2002). Ivory Coast Conflict, Retrieved March 5, 2003, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast.htm

2. Carment, D. and James, P. (n.d.) Escalation of Ethnic Conflict: A Survey and Assessment, Retrieved March 5, 2003, from http://www.carleton.ca/~dcarment/papers/escalati.html.

3. Coplin, W.D. (1976). Everyman’s Prince: A guide to understanding your political problems. New York: Wadsworth Pub. Co.

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